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What a herculean and even impossible task! To describe and analytically 
order the range of client-organization relations in the social welfare sector 
in the united States. The task is herculean because the amount of variation 
is so enormous. We must account for variance across governmental juris- 
dications(loca1, state, and federal), between private and public providers, 
and across the range of substantive programs - from the treatment of mental 
illness to the payment of pension checks. 
This paper provides an analytic framework within which to view the 
encounter of citizen and welfare organization. We provide a framework that 
allows us to understand and gain perspective on the diverse images of client- 
organization encounters found in our common stereotypes and also provided in 
some of the scholarly literature. 
On the one hand, welfare clients may be seen as shuffling step-n-fetch- 
its, kow-towing with neck bent, bag ladies, keeping their wary distance. 
On the other hand, clients may be satisfied citizens, getting their rightful 
due. 
Some of the research literature, especially that which looks at "street- 
level bureaucracy" might give impressions of wide discretion on the part of 
bureaucrats (see Prottas). Although this literature does not explicitly 
examine the issue, it suggests that citizens are at the mercy of powerful 
bureaucrats. On the other hand, another body of literature, usually based 
upon survey instruments, reports wide-spread satisfaction with social wel- 
fare services, at least as contrasted with "constraint" agencies. .(See l l 
table 1 from Katz, et. al). Tables 1 and 2 present data from a national sur- 
vey of adult respondents who were asked about their contacts with a variety 
of agencies. Not surprisingly, the service agencies have a more satisfied 
clientele than the constraint agencies. 
Table 1 
"How Satisfied Were You with the Way the Office Handled Your Problem?" 
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Table 2 
"Looking at the Whole Experience Would You Say that Government Officials Handled It Very Poorly, 
Poorly, Fairly Well, or Very Well?" 










Type of Problem . . 
Driver's Traffic 
license violations Tax Police Other Total 
9.8% 11.5% 11.3% 5.7% 5.5% 9.0% 
26.8 30.8 23.9 17.1 32.4 25.7 
26.8 30.8 25.3 20.0 18.9 24.2 
24; 4 19.2 22.5 48.6 18.9 26.2 
2.4 0 2.8 0 0 1.4 
9.8 7.7 14.1 8.6 24.3 12.9 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(41). (26) (71) (35) (37) (210) 
Source: Table 1, Katz, et al., p. 64 - Table 2, Katz et al., p. 102. 
Moreover, the public assigns very different priorities to expanding or 
contracting different public programs. Recently, the Chronicle of Higher 
Education reported the results of a recent national survey conducted by the 
Group Attitudes Corporation. (See table 3). 
These data suggest very different levels of public support for different 
welfare state programs. Medical care for the aged and social security are 
"ok." Social-welfare programs - meaning we suspect AFDC and public assist-> . 
in conjunction with 
ance - are not. These supporting and denigrating attitudesxegal mandates 
and service delivery problems translate into bureaucratic encounters. 
We proceed as follows. In the first two sections we discuss a theory 
of bureaucratic encounters based upon exchange-power dependence concepts. 
The beginning point of this theory, and much elaborated, is that the bureau- 
cratic control or power over the client is related to the'control of vital 
goods or services which cannot be obtained elsewhere. To the extent that 
the client has alternatives for the procurement of these goods or services 
.- - 
or controls resources, including enforceable legal- rights, that can be brought 
to bear on the bureaucrat, the client controls or gains power in relation- 
ship to the bureaucrat. The bureaucratic encounter occurs in an organi- 
zational and societal context. Section I1 spells out the contextual variables 
that impinge upon power-dependence relations. 
In Section I11 we show how the theoretical distinctions discussed 
in the previous two sections work themselves out in three substantive areas. 
We discussed the delivery of services to the mentally ill, social security 
and pension programs and AF'DC and public assistance. These are chosen be- 
cause they are central programatic areas of the welfare state and because 
they vary dramatically on variables relevant to our theory. In our dis- 
cussion, we emphasize that these arenas of client-bureaucratic encounters 
are in flux. How they have changed and how these changes impinge upon the 
Table 3 
Public Attitudes Toward Cutting ~ederallyf inanced Programs 
---__------------------------------------------------------ ___ - 
Should not Should Should 
be cut be cut be cut 
at all somewhat drastically 
Medical care for the aged . . . . . . . .  68.0% 19.2% 9.5% 
Medical and cancer research. . . . . . . .  62.0% 27.6% 7.4% 
Energy, research and development . . . . .  43.1% 40.4% 13.4% 
Aid to higher -educati@n. . . . . . . . . :  42.2% 38.3% 15.0% 
School lunch program . . . . . . . . . . .  33.5% 44.0% 18.4% 
National-defense spending. . . . . . . . .  32.5% 42.0% 22.3% 
Aid to agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . .  28.6% 52.4% 13.9% 
Social-welfare programs. . . . . . . . . .  22.5% 43.0% 31.6% 
Space program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19.9% 46.3% 30.7% 
Source: The Chronicle of Higher Education, September 29, 1982, p. 3. 
relation of the state and bureaucrat to client is a central issue. 
Section IV briefly takes up the issue of citizenship rights and 
bureaucrats. Ever since T. H. Marshall wrote about the evolving nature of 
citizenship rights we have been aware that the emergence of the welfare 
state ties the issues of citizenship' and rights. Yet, these rights are 
\J 
caught in a political debate. We will want to examine, although briefly, 
how changing conceptions and enforceable rights in American impinge upon 
bureaucratic encounters. 
I: Power-Dependence in Client-Organization Relations 
The relations between clients and organizations can be conceived as a 
series of transactions through which resources and services are exchanged 
between them. Clients interact with an organization, voluntarily or in- 
voluntarily, to obtain the resources and services it controls, and in a 
manner that optimizes their perceived payoffs and minimizes their per- 
ceived costs. The organization interacts with clients, by choice or by edict, 
to obtain the resources they control, and in a manner that optimizes the 
payoffs and minimizes the costs as defined by those who wield power in the 
organization. 
1 
For example, the relations between applicants for public aid and the 
welfare department can be seen as a series of encounters in which: (a) the 
client attempts to obtain the highest level of public assistance with as 
little "hassle" as possible; and (b) the officials attempt to "weed" out 
the "undeserving" poor and reduce overpayment errors while maintaining 
acceptable working conditions. Similarly, the relations between clients and 
social workers in a family service agency represents a series of transactions 
%here may be instances in which neither the client nor the organization 
sees any benefit at all from the relationship, which may have been forced upon 
them. In such cases, the chief aim of the interacting parties will be to 
minimize their costs. 
through which clients seek help and advice congruent with their interests 
and values, but which will also minimize the associated financial, social, 
and psychological costs; the workers attempt to provide services in accordance 
with agency policies (reflecting the interests of the power-wielders) and their 
own professional interests, but which will also minimize the use of the . I .  
agency's and their own professional resources (hence, the interest, for 
example, in clients with third-party insurance). 
This perspective suggests that the interests of the client and the 
interests of the organization are inherently distinct: the interests of 
the former emanate from the complex set of attributes that determine individual 
behavior; the interests of the latter emanate from the organizational dynamics 
that shape the roles of its staff. 
The ability of each party to structure the components of the exchange 
relations to accord with its interests is a function of the power-dependence 
relations between them. Power can be defined as the ability of A to obtain 
favorable outcomes from B at B's expense (Cook and Emerson, 1978). That 
is, the costs to A of obtaining B's resources or services are lower than 
the costs to B for getting similarly desired resources or services from A. 
The power of A over B, is equal to the dependence of B on A. Such dependence 
varies directly with the desirability of the resources or services controlled 
by A to B, and inversely with the availability of such resources or services 
from alternative sources; A is said to have a power advantage over B when 
the dependence of B 0n.A is greater than the dependence of A on B. Having 
.a power advantage gives A.the potential to use its transactions with B to 
get additional benefits at B's expense. 
Using this framework, we can say that the dependence of the client on 
the organization, and thus, the power df the organization over the client, 
is directly proportional to the client's need for the organization's services 
and inversely proportional to the availability of the services from alternative 
sources. Similarly, the dependence of the organization on the client is 
directly proportional to the organization's need for the client's resources 
and inversely proportional to the availability of such resources elsewhere. 
It can be readily seen that in many human services the organization has a 
considerable power advantage over its clients because it monopolizes ser- 
vices they need. Thus the clients have few or no alternatives, while the 
organization has many more potential clients than it can serve. This is most 
apparent, for example, in the area of public assistance. While the welfare 
department has a virtual monopoly over such aid and an abundance of appli- 
cants, the client may be in dire need and has nowhere else to turn. 
A central argument advanced in this paper is that the power advantage 
of human service organizations enables them to exercise considerable control 
over the lives of the recipients of their services. Moreover, organizations 
will use this power advantage to shape staff-client transactions in such a 
way that the outcomes will enhance their legitimation, flow of resources, and 
power. Put differently, when the service provision process has important 
consequences for the political and economic life of the organization, the 
dominant coalition and other centers of power in it will attempt to use any 
power advantage over clients in pursuit of their interests. For example, 
with a power advantage, the organization may attempt to select clients who 
will enhance its reputation and facilitate the mobilization of legitimation 
and resources (Greenley and Kirk, 1983). In the case of public assistance, 
it has been shown that during civil unrest and economic prosperity, it is to 
the interest of the organization's elite to expand the welfare rolls and 
to relax application procedures. During economic decline, however, the 
elite will seek to reduce the rolls and to tighten and restrict application 
procedures (Ritti and Hymna, 1977). Professional groups within the or- 
ganization may use the power advantage so that the.outcomes of their trans- 
actions with clients confirm their professional ideologies and buttress their 
status (Freidson, 1970; Krebs, 1971). Finally, street-level bureaucrats may 
use the power advantage to control and improve their working conditions 
(Prottas, 1979) . a' 
Clients who have a power advantage over the organization, as a-result 
of the resources they possess, can similarly use it to control transactions 
with the organization to optimize their interests. In particular, such 
clients will be in a better bargaining position to improve the congruency 
between their personal goals and the organization's output objectives and to 
control the transfers of resources and the outcomes of the exchanges. For 
example, both the study by Clark (1956) of the transformation of the adult 
education program and that by Zald and Denton (1963) of the changes in the 
YMCA indicate that as the dependence of these organizations on income generated 
by clients increased, program changes occurred that more closely reflected 
clients' demands. Rushing (1978) found that powerless clients are more 
likely to be committed involuntarily to mental hospitals. Similarly, patients 
from higher socioeconomic backgrounds tend, in general, to have access to 
better medical care than lower-class patients (Krauss, 1977). Powerful 
clients can also influence the patterns of their relations with the service 
providers. They, for example, tend to have access to better-trained staff 
and receive more prompt attention (Schwartz, 1975). 
One measure of the power advantage of a human service organization over 
its clients is the extent and amount of discretion it has in making de- 
cisions about their lives. (Gummer, 1979; Handler, 1973). Everything else being 
equal, the greater the discretion of the service providers to select courses 
of action on the basis of their own judgments, the greater their power over.: 
clients. Herein lies the essence of professional power. The exercise of 
discretion permits the service providers, while attending to the needs of 
clients, to make decisions that promote their own interests, which may not 
be consonant with those of the client. 
Having a power advantage increases the probability that it will be used -
as long .as additional benefits can be attained or the costs for attaining 
them can be reduced. However, internal and external constraints play an 
important part in the use of power by khe exchanging parties. Internal con- 
straints emanate from the norms upheld by the.organization and the client 
that govern the exchange relations (Cook and Emerson, 1978). The organization, 
for example, may uphold norms that stress fairness and equity, comrhitment 
to the needs of the client, and respect for the client's rights; norms that 
are typically embodied in a professional code of ethics. These restrain 
officials from using their power advantage beyond organizationally prescribed 
boundaries, and occasionally even encourage suspension of organizational 
rules in favor of the client. In a study of appeals to the Israel Customs 
authorities, Danet (1973) found that 70 percent of the clients were treated 
in a universalistic fashion, reflecting the norm of fairness. But 29 percent 
received a favorable result even though their claims lacked legal justification. 
These were immigrants whose attributes indicated them to be "underdogs" 
and powerless, yet the bureaucracy "gave them a break" because of a norm of 
helping such immigrants integrate into Israeli society. 
External constraints, particularly on the organization, are expressed 
through law, statutes, and administrative regulations designed to protect 
the rights of clients. The Mental Health Code for the State of Michigan, 
for example, contains a Patient's Bill of Rights that is aimed at preventing 
potential abuse and ensuring that patients receive appropriate and humane 
care. Nonetheless, a study of the 'utilization of these mechanisms to protect 
clients has identified several problems that limit their effectiveness 
(Handler, 1979). First, to use the legal remedies available to them, . 
clients must be aware of their existence, must have the resources to pursue 
them, and must anticipate that the benefits will outweigh the possible costs. 
Meeting these conditions is obviously difficult for many clients. Second, 
the use of administrative monitoring and supereision requires the formulation 
of explicit standards for the provision of services and effective information- 
gathering devices, both of which are highly problematic in human service 
organizations. Formulation of such standards is not possible for many ser- 
vice technologies, and the front-line character of these organizations pre- 
vents collection of valid and reliable information. Third, the relations 
between monitoring agencies, human service organizations and clients are such 
that the organizations have considerably more resources with which to in- 
fluence the agencies and possibly coopt them. 
11: The Context of Citizens' Encounters 
The power-dependence relations between clients and officials are shaped 
by the context in which they occur. The context refers to the macro social 
structural conditions of a particular welfare sector which define the bounda- 
ries of the exchange relations and determine the amount of power each party 
can mobilize. Anticipated above, we discuss four contextual variables: 
a) social correlates of the demand; b) structure of the welfare sector; 
C) norms of the exchange; and d) administration of the service delivery 
system. 
A. Social Correlates of "Demand" 
The social correlates of the "demand" for specific welfare services 
define the characteristics of the public's initiating contacts with welfare 
programs and the personal resources they can mobilize. By "demand" we mean 
the goods and services deficit as defined by both clients and service pro- 
viders. A critical variable shaping these characteristics is the.,social 
epidemiology" of "demand." That is, the incidence, frequency and severity 
of the "demand" for various welfare services is differentially correlated 
with socio-demographic characteristics which in~turn define the social 
status of the potential recipients. Thus, the socio demographic character- 
istics associated with poverty, define the social status of the potential 
recipients of public assistance or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) . 
Overwhelmingly, these are likely to be female heads of household, elderly, 
disabled and minorities. In contrast, the "demand" for Social Security 
is obviously correlated with persons over the age of 65, but less with other 
social characteristics. The "social epidemiology" of mental illness, how- 
ever, is such that the incidence and frequency of various forms of mental 
illness significantly varies by social class. The highest overall rate of 
psychiatric disorders is consistently found in the lowest social class 
(Dohrenwand, 1975). In general, the lower the social class position of the 
potential recipients the less power they have in their exchange relations 
with officials. 
Second, expression of "demand" will be a function of citizenship rights 
and entitlementsfor the services of a welfare sector. Extension of citizen- 
ship rights and entitlementsreduce class differentiation and reliance on 
personal resources, thus granting clients more power in the welfare sector. 
One measure of such entitlement in the U.S. is the extent to which potential 
recipients perceive that they actually pay or make contributions to finance 
the services they seek. Hence, persons seeking social security benefits 
perceive themselves to have greater entitlement to them than persons seeking 
public assistance, while persons needing mental health services cannot readily 
make claim for them by virtue of entitlement, unless they are willing to pay 
for them directly or through insurance. 
Third, expression of "demand" is also a function of public awareness. 
Greater public awareness of the services of a welfare sector increases the 
demand for such services and-improves the ability of clients to negotiate for 
them. 
B. Sector Structure 
The structure of the welfare sector determines the availability and 
accessibility of the services to the public. First, the domain and mandate 
given to the sector (which reflects its political legitimation) prescribes 
in normative terms who "deserves" its services. Such prescription, to para- 
phrase Titmuss, determines the universality or selectivity of the distribution 
of the sector's services, as well as the attributes of the population rightly 
entitled to them. Hence, to the extent that the sector's domain and mandate 
define a large segment of the population needing its services as "unde- 
serving," as in the case of public assistance, they are stripped of any power 
in their bureaucratic encounters (see for example, Roth's [1972] account of 
poor people's reliance on emergency room; - outpatient services). 
Second, the scarcity or munificence of the services will influence the 
degree of public dependence on them. The greater the scarcity of the ser- 
vices, the greater the dependence of the public on the sector. 
Third, the centralization or decentralization of control over the 
distribution of the services, determines the boundaries of citizens' ability 
to negotiate with the service providers. When the control over the service 
is highly centralized as in the case of Social Security, citizens have little 
room, if any, to negotiate with officials, and variation from official to 
official is limited. When the control over the services is highly diffused, 
and' fragmented as in the case of mental health services, citizens have con- 
siderable room to negotiate for services, and the nature and quality of 
services they receive varies significantly with their ability to mobilize 
power and command resources. 
C. Sector Administration 
The aspect of sector administration we are interested in is the amount 
of discretion granted to officials. The greater the discretion of officials 
the greater is their potential power advantage over clients (Handler, Gummer). 
A key determinant of the discretion officials have is the nature of the 
service technology itself. The more routinized the service technology the 
less discretion officials have. For example, because the technology of 
determination of social security benefits is highly routinized as compared 
to the technology of psychotherapy, the discretion of social security 
officials is minimal compared to the discretion granted to mental health 
workers. The latter, then, can use their discretion of advance interests 
which may be incongruent with the interests of their clients (Prottas, 1979). 
Human service organizations have relied on professionalization to curb 
the potential abuses of discretion. Professional norms are assumed to protect 
the welfare of the clients and constrain officials from using their power 
advantage for personal or organizational gains. At the same time, the pro- 
fessionalization of staff increases their power over clients by virtue of 
their control over expertise and knowledge. Hence, although professionali- 
zation increases clients' dependence it may strengthen equity and fairness 
in the norms of the exchange. 
D. Norms of Exchange 
The norms of the exchange relations institutionalized in the welfare 
sector determine the extent to which potential power advantages or dis- 
parities can be exploited by either officials or citizens. First, to the 
extent to which norms of equity and fairness are enforced in the sector, 
both officials and citizens are constrained in using their power advantages 
(Kroeger, 1982). "Giving the underdog a break" is another instance of such 
norms (Danet, 1 .  In contrast, when no clear norms of equity and fairness 
are specified or enforced, as in the case of custodial care of the mentally 
ill, officials will use their power advantage to attain benefits which may 
be determinants to their clients. 
Second, to the extent that the norms of exchange stigmatize or degrade 
clients, they put them in a power disadvantage. Norms of exchange result in 
degradation when they impute moral inferiority of those seeking the service 
as in the case of application for public assistance (Roth, 1972). These 
norms derive, in part, from the sector's domain definition, particularly who 
are the "deserving" and the "undeserving." 
111: The Framework Applied: Encounters in Three Sectors 
Let us apply the framework developed above to encounters in three 
different sectors. We briefly review the nature of encounters within the 
mental health system; social security (OASDI) and public assistance (AFDC 
and general assistance. ) Figure 1 schematically. locates program sectors-& 
contextual dimensions discussed above. 
A. Social Security Encounters 
Old Age survivors and Disability Insurance is a bed rock program of 
the Welfare State. It comes the closest of any welfare program to the "ideal" 
of universal coverage. It is given as a matter "of earned right." Financed 
by compulsory taxes on employees and employers, it covers about 95 percent 
of the civilian employed labor force (see p. 58 Social Security Bulletin: 






















































and farm workers were excluded in early years, the general trend has been 
to increase the range of populations covered. -Some public employees may 
be covered under retirement programs outside the social security trust funds. 
Sixty-three percent of retired Americans aged 65 and over say that benefits 
are their largest source of income. (Aging in the 80s: America in Transition, 
p. 87) . 
For our purposes, the key points are that beneficiaries automatically 
qualify if they have a sufficient work-contribution history. The amount of 
benefits is fixed by formula. Workers with a lower amount of contribution 
get a larger proportion of average monthly wage than workers with a higher 
average monthly wage. There is no bureaucratic discretion in the allocation 
of amounts, nor is there state-and local variation. 
In short, the context of citizens' encounters with Social' Security is 
such that it grants them considerable power vis-a-vis the officials. Social 
Security is only minimally class differentiated, and citizens have full en- 
titlement rights and high awareness of their entitlement. The domain and 
mandate of the.program is universal, and while there are projections of 
serious resource scarcity, citizens do not as yet experience any. The control 
over the program is highly centralized resulting in no administrative dis- 
cretion. The norms of exchange enforce a high degree of equity and fairness 
and no stigma. 
The "earned right" language and "insurance" metaphor have led to a sense 
of citizen deservingness, of proper entitlement. Social Security is not con- 
sidered "welfare," a dirty word. We do not know whether the American public 
distinguishes "earned rights" from insurance; whether the majority recognize 
that their contributions actually pay next year's beneficiaries, and are not 
invested to return at time of retirement. We do not know whether the sense 
of entitlement is based on Congress' guarantees, on citizens' perceptions 
of "forced" savings, or on bureaucratic behavior, the routine delivery of 
benefits. (See Gates, 1981, for a discussion of the use of insurance metaphor 
in institutional myth-making in the Social Security Administration.) 
We do know that the system has large support and that clients in contact 
are much more satisfied with the social security system than clients in contact 
with public welfare. One clear indication of the accessibility of Social 
Security and the power citizens feel in interacting with its officials is 
the exceptionally high utilization rate. In contrast, Supplemental Security 
Insurance which has been "federalized" in 1972 as part of the social Security 
Administration exper ie -n~esacons iderab l~  ower utilization ratelranging from 
67 to 73% (Drazga, et al, 1982. See also Menefee at al, 1981). It has been 
suggested that the perceived stigma attached to the program, its means test 
procedures, and lack of sufficient public awareness all contribute to the 
lower rate. So far, studies attempting to identify barriers to SSI utili- 
zation are equivocal. 
A study by Goodsell (1980) comparing clients responses to social security, 
public welfare and unemployment compensation, clearly indicates that citizens 
rate the quality of their encounters with Social Security to be superior 
to the others on several indicators (see table 4). These findings are re- 
plicated in every study of citizens'evaluation of their experiences with 
Social Security. (It is interesting to speculate on the lower satisfaction 
with Unemployment compensation reflected in the data. Is it a function of 
greater anger at the outset, or more harassing procedures, or greater un- 
clarity about norms?) 
This is not to suggest that citizensv encounters with Social Security 
are devoid of difficulties. The complexity of the program is such that 
citizens may experience delays and 1ags.i.n the processing of their claims, 
experience errors, or try to manipulate officials by withholding certain 
Table 4 
Perceptions of Clients of Success, and Program Responsiveness 
___-_--_------_---------------------------------------------- ___- _-- _ _ _ ---- 
Proportion of Clients Who: 
Social Public Unemployment 
Security Welfare' Compensation 
( %'I ( % I  ( % I  
Achieved what they came for in 
the encounter 
(N) 85.0 70.0 68.8 
(80) (80) (80). 
Argued with office personnel 
during encounter 
(N 
Agree that by and large govt. 
serves the public well 
(N) 
Agree that the little man often 
gets pushed around by govt. 
(N) 
Expect to remember something 
"really nice" about the 
encounter 
Expect to remember something 
"really unpleasant" about 
the encounter 
(N) 
Source: Goodsell (1980) 
information. Similarly to all other welfare programs, Social Security regularly 
initiates termination of benefits due to a variety of reasons such as re- 
marriage or divorce, changes in disability status, death, and the like. 
These do result in occasional disputes. Nonetheless, overall the program 
experiences wide-spread acceptance and legitimation. 
B. Public ~ssistance Encounters 
Public assistance has been one of the most controversial and vilified 
welfare programs in the U.S. Its critics on the right have seen it as a 
"haven for the chislers and rip-off artists," while its critics on the left 
have viewed it as the vehicle of oppression of the poor, women and minorities. 
In contrast to Social Security, entitlement rights are at best partial. 
Citizens must demonstrate "deservingness," and accept loss of personal liber- 
ties as a precondition for receipt of welfare. Although there is considerable 
public awareness of Public Assistance, it tends to be negative, and public 
opinion polls persistently indicate that citizens grant it reluctant legi- 
timation, perceiving the program as an undue burden to the taxpayers. 
The program is clearly associated with the lumpenproletariat, for it is 
targeted exclusively to the lowest socio-economic groups. It is selective 
in the distribution of its services, making sure that only the "deserving 
poor" will have access to them. Public Assistance has always operated under 
conditions of extreme resource scarcity, which are particularly manifest 
at times of declining economic growth. Moreover, while the control over 
the program has become more centralized, with the federal government setting 
elaborate national standards, nonetheless, state and local governments can 
still exercise considerable discretion in its administration. Studies by 
Tropman and Gordon (1978), Iams and Maniha (1980), and Isaac and Kelly (1981) 
suggest that levels of AFDC grants as set by the states vary significantly 
and are influenced by both economic and political variables including state 
wealth, education, population growth, minority populations, and racial in- 
surgency. Efforts have been made to routinize the administration of public 
assistance (Pilliavin, et al., 1979); nonetheless, officials still exercise 
significant discretion, particularly in special grants components of Public 
Assistance. 
Finally, while efforts have been made to increase the equity and 
fairness in the administration of public assistance, these have been, at 
best, partial. Moreover, the program continues to stigmatize its recipients, 
a stigma reinforced by the mass media. 
These contextual characteristics of Public Assistance foster conflict 
ridden encounters between officials and recipients. The power dependence 
relations are such that officials have considerable power over the recipients 
which can be used to intimidate and discourage potential and actual recipients. 
Although the use of Public Assistance has risen dramatically in the seventies 
/'\ 
(the number of recipients increased. from 3 million'. in 1960 to over 10.3 
millions in 19791, numerous studies suggest that less than half of all per- 
sons eligible for PA actually receive them (see a review'of these studies 
by Prottas, 1981. See also, Bendick, 1979). The stigma attached to Public 
Assistance and the partial granting of entitlement rights undoubtedly play 
a critical role in the underutilization of Public Assistance. As Hasenfeld 
and Steinrnetz (1981) and Prottas (1981) argue, officials can use their power 
to establish numerous barriers to citizens encounters. These include long 
waiting, public disclosure of intimate and private information, inability 
to comprehend bureaucratic procedures, and control over information. Bendick 
and Cantu (l.978), for example, noted that while 75% of all welfare applicants 
have reading skills no higher than 8th grade level, only 11% of all welfare 
applications and documentations were judged accessible to persons with 
8th grade level of education. Several case studies of client encounters 
with welfare officials suggest that officials may give preference to clients 
that are perceived as cooperative and non-demanding (Prottas, 1979), and to 
clients who have significant bureaucratic experience (Gordon, 1975). 
Nonetheless, the power advantage of officials is checked. It is con- 
trolled by bureaucratic norms which stress universality and fairness. These 
norms, reinforced by legal protection of clients rights, ensure that the 
potential abuse of discretion is minimized, albeit not eliminated. Hence, 
Kroeger (1975) found that Public Assistance officials tend to adhere to these 
normsand avoid discrimination among their clients. 
The ambivalence and potential conflict in these exchanges can be noted 
in studies of perceptions of clients and officials toward each other. 
Goodsell (1980) found that welfare officials attribute significantly less 
honesty to their clients than social security officials (see table 5). 
Studies of clients perceptions of welfare officials by Katz, et al. (19741, 
Nelson (1979), and Goodsell (1980), suggest the following: In comparison 
to Social Security, clients express less satisfaction, less helpfulness and 
less fairness by welfare officials (see table 6). The difference in expression 
of complete satisfaction with Social Security as compared to welfare is 
approximately 20 to 35%. The differences in expression of helpfulness and 
fairness range from 15% to 20%. 
The importance of the context of the program on its evaluation is well 
exemplified in the changes of clients' perceptions when SSI replaced Old Age 
Assistance, Aid to the Blind and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. 
As reported by Tissue (1978) feelings of stigma have declined significantly 
(from 22% to 9% in the case of OAA and from 34% to 14% in AB/APTD) , and 
perception of responsiveness increased slightly. 
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Source: Goodsell (1980) 
Table 6 
Clients' Perceptions of Officials 
----_----_-__-------------------- _ _ ---_-
A. Satisfaction with the Encounter 
Social Security 
Goodsell Katz et al. 
Very satisfied 68 - 4  64.2 
Fairly satisfied 16.5 23.7 
Somewhat satisfied 6.3 3.5 
Very dissatisfied 8.9 2.9 
Welfare 
Goodsell Katz et al. 




.. . Very 
j : . .  Somewhat 
Unfair 
(N) 













Social Security Welfare 
Nelson Katz Goodsell* Nelson Katz Goodsell* 
78.3 87.3 74.7 58.2 67.0 61.3 
*treated courteously 
Source : Goodsell (1980) 
Katz et al. (1974) 
Nelson (1979) 
would have .been even more pronounced given both the predicament of welfare 
clients (i-e., being under personal duress) and the presumed omnipotence and 
social control function of welfare officials. Of course, it is quite possible 
that the initial expectations of welfare clients are considerably lower than 
clients of other social programs, thus muting the apparent differences noted 
above. Yet, one should not underestimate the importance of the norms of 
universalism and fairness exercised by most welfare officials in controlling 
these exchange relations. 
d. Mental Illness and the Mental Health System: Federal Intervention, 
Universalism, and Social Garbage 
We have included a discussion of client-bureaucratic encounters in the 
mental health system because it provides a sharp contrast with bureaucracies 
offering largely cash benefits. Several features of the system are worthy 
of note. First, it is a highly decentralized and fragmented system. While 
most states have department of institutions or mental health that provide 
residential care, the federal government has had little presence in this 
arena. Second, until the coming of Comprehensive Community Mental Health 
Center Act of 1963, the Federal Government had no role in the provision or 
regulation of local mental health services. Third, the area of mental health 
is characterized by a loose diagnostic system for analyzing problems and a 
loose technology of treatment. Both what should be treated, by whom, with 
what techniques, has been a subject of continuing debate, modification, and 
differentiation. Finally, the mental health system historically has been 
heavily class-segmented. On the one hand, large public institutions were 
the reservoir for lower class clientele and for the long-term treatment of 
the elderly and the middle-class. On the other hand, a fee for service 
private practice grew up to handle the middle and upper classes. Moreover, 
even within public agencies that were not hospitals, services have been allo- 
cated on a class basis. The poor received services from beginning workers, 
while upper-status clientele received more prestigeful therapists (see 
Hollingshead and Redlich). 
Several- trends can be observed that bear on issues of client-bureaucratic 
encounters. First, beginning in the 1950s with the development of psycho- 
tropic drugs and with the growing awareness of the negative effects of 
institutionalization, the large state mental hospitals have become used much 
less as grab bags for the institutionalized population. 
Nursing homes and homes for the aged bled off the elderly from 
the institutions for the mentally ill.. AS this happened, and as a variety 
of interventions occurred, the average number of patients in mental hospitals 
at any one point in time declined, even while the average number of patients 
in a hospital during a year has increased. Stated another way, more people 
are being served.for shorter lengths of time. 
Moreover, the growth.of medical insurance that-covers hospitalization 
.and short-term care, and federal and state funding of community mental health 
centers and of psychiatric beds in general hospitals has ledto an increase 
in local utilization. Figure 2, which excludes the enormous growth of fully 
private treatment by solo practitioners, testifies to the enormous growth 
of non-institutional treatment. There has been a vast increase in general 
hospital beds and outpatient clinics and in community mental health centers 
as auspices for the treatment of psychiatrically related problems. 
Second, constitutional test cases have restricted the ability of police 
and family to institutionalize citizens when the citizen objects. It is much 
harder to have an involuntary commitment today. 
Third, the loosely defined nature of mental health and mental illness 
means that the state supported agencies regularly have responsibility for a 
PERCENT DlSlRlBUl!ONS O$ INPATIENT AND OUTPATIENT 
i 
CARE EPISODES Y N lWENYAL HEALTH FACILITIES. 
BY TYPE OF FACILITY: UNITED STATES, 1955 AND 1973" 











OUTPATIENT PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 
7% 
16% 
1955 (1.7 MILLION EPISODES) 1973 (5.2 M lLLlOM EPISODES) 
*INCLUDES RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT CENT En3 FQn EMOTIONALLY DlSTUnDED CHILDREN 
**SEE FOOTNOiES OF TAOLE 1 FOR EXPLANATION OF C A I  EOORIES 
SOURCE: DIVISION OF BIOMETRY. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH 
range of problems of behavior and social and familial functioning that defy 
precise legal definition. More than any other area, the encounter here is 
subject to professional as opposed to legal definition, and the services to 
be rendered are determined by the local agency political economy. Client 
and workers relate around a presenting problem. What they do in any speci- 
fic case is related to the agency's position in a network of local agencies, 
including the local juvenile court, the school system, the state mental 
health system, professional ideology, and client readiness and interest. 
Table 7 indicates outpatient settings handle an enormous range of personal 
troubles. Indeed, it is very clear that historically most people have used 
resources outside of the formal mental health system when they were in need 
of ,help. 
There is paucity of good data at the national level concerning patterns 
of utilization and responsiveness of mental health resources. One exception 
is the national surveys on mental health in America reported by Veroff, 
Kulka and Douvan (1981). As shown in table 8, there has been an increased 
readiness to use formal help in the past decade, suggesting that some of the 
barriers such as stigma, and financial resources have been eased. Nonethe- 
less, over 44% of the respondents in 1957 and 36% of the respondents in 
1976 were - ; unlikely to use formal help. The decline in resistance 
to use professional help is evident in the findings presented in '.table 9. 
Persons experiencing impending nervous breakdown were more likely to use 
mental health professionals in 1976 than in 1957. Ability to pay and 
availability of mental health resources still played a significant factor 
in self referral, but their importance declined somewhat in 1976. Per 
capita expenditures and facilities for mental health care in the counties of 
residence were positively correlated with formal help seeking behavior. 
Women, young people and persons with higher level of education are more 
Table 7 
Distribution of Patient Care Episodes in Inpatient and Outpatient 
Psychiatric Facilities by Sex, United States, 1971 
----_-----------_------------------------------------------------ ---_-__----_---_-------------------------------------------------: 
Inpatient services Outpatient services 
Diagnosis 
Males Females Males Females 
Number of episodes 
All disorders ........... 933,316 759,436 1,111,260 1,205,494 
Percent distribution of episodes 
~ l l  disorders ........... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
...... Mental retardation 
Organic brain syndromes. 
........... Schizophrenia. 
Depressive disorders .... 
......... Other psychoses 
....... Alcohol disorders 
Drug disorders. ......... 
.......... All others:[. 
Undiagnosed ............. 
1/ This category of "all other disorders" includes paranoid states, neuroses - 
(excluding depressive neurosis), personality disorders, sexual deviations, 
psychophysiologic disorders, transient situational disturbances, behavior 
disorders of childhood and adolescence, special symptoms not elsewhere 
classified, and social maladjustments without manifest psychiatric disorders. 
Table 8 
Distribution of Readiness for Self-Referral, 
1957 and 1976 ........................................... 
Year 
Readiness' for Self-Referral 
1. Has used help 
2. Could have used help 
3. Might need help 
4. Self-help 
5. Strong self-help 
6. Not ascertained 
Total 
Total Number 
Source: Veroff et al. (19811, p. 79 
Table 9 
Sources of Professional Help Used by People Who Had Felt an 
Impending Nervous Breakdown (by year) 
. . .. ....................................................... . .
Year of Interview 
1957 1976 
Source of Help ( %  1 ( %  1 
Clergy 3 3 
Doctor 7 7 5 2 
Psychiatrist or psychologist 4 18 
- 
~ a r r i a ~ e  counselor - c - c 
Other mental health source 3 10 




Total  umber^ 231 227 
a 
Does not include the 233 people in 1957 and 245 in 1976 
who had felt an impending nervous breakdown but did not mention 
referring the problem to any professional help resource. 
b~ndicates that percentages total to more than 100 percent 
because some respondents mentioned more than one source. 
Source: Veroff, et al., p. 137 
likely to use formal help. As noted in table 10, among the reasons given 
for not using formal help, lack of knowledge, stigma, projected failure, 
and expense--organizational barriers--still loom in.importance, accounting 
for 44% and 43% of the reasons given in 1957 and 1976, respectively. 
The perception of helpfulness of professional help is noted in table 11 
In general, persons tend to view professional help quite favorably. How- 
ever, persons who went to marriage counselors and other mental health pro- 
fessionals were more likely to disapprove the help they received. In con- 
trast, the clergy and doctors remain the most favorably perceived helpers, 
although in 1976 psychiatrists/psychologists are viewed as more helpful than 
in 1957, and clergy as less helpful. 
What can we say about citizenship and class as it affects this encounter 
between family and agency? There is some evidence that the growth of community 
mental health centers and the private insurance funding of 0.P.C.s has made 
non-institutional settings more available to the working and poorer groups. 
The availability of professional services for the non-psychotic, to put it 
differently, is just much larger. Secondly, public mental hospitals remain 
the reservoir for long-term lower class patients. Third, familial resources 
make an enormous difference in the kinds of services received (see Rushing, 
1978). Finally, the deinstitutionalization movement and the voluntary nature 
of the system increases the freedom and vulnerability of patient populations. 
The deinstitutionalization movement which has swept the country (see Lerman, 
1982) has, when coupled with the voluntary nature of the system, led to an 
enormous range of services for the deinstitutionalized mental patient. On 
the one hand, some of these programs represent the best of the welfare state, 
aiming for the fullest inclusion of partially disabled people in the life of 
. Table 10 
. . 
Reasons Given for Not Going for Help by People Who Feel 
They Could' Have Used Some Help (by year) 
....................................................... 
Year of Interview 
Reasons for Not Going for Help 
1957 
( % I  
Self-help - worked it out myself (ourselves) 2 5 3 1 
Lack of knowledge about means - didn't know 
how to go about it 19 
Shame, stigma, hesitancy - ashamed to talk 
about it 14 
Didn't think it would help 7 
Temporizing - felt it would work out itself 6 
Didn't realize need at the time 
Problem involved other person who refused to 
go for help 
Expense 
Other 




Indicates that percentages total to more than 100 percent because 
some respondents gave more than one response. 
Source: Veroff et al. (1981), p. 196 
Table 11 
. . -  
-/ 
Relationship of  Source if Help Used to Perception of Helpfulness of Treutrnent (by year) 
Source of Help 
Psychiatrist1 Marriage Other Mental Social Service 
I 
Clergy Doctor Psychologist Counselor Health Source Agency Lawyer Other 
1957 1976 1957 1976 1957 1976 1957 1976 1957 1976 1957 1976 1957 1976 1957 1976 
HowMuchHelped (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%I (%) (%) (%) (%) (96) (1) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
l-lelped, helped a lot 65 64 49 25 34 50 43 44 
58 64 62 - 2 5  46 42 43 55 
Helped (qualified) 13 12 13 8 27 36 33 29 
22 15 14 24 25 26 29 24 P 
Did not help 18 14 23 67 30 14 14 20 o 
11 9 20 5 1 21 21 14 8' 
Don't know - 1 5 - 3 - - 2 = :  
1 2 3 - 4 - - - 
Not ascertained 4 10 - 6 - - 9 - -  -  10 - 5 - 
100% 8 100% 10 100% 1 100% - - - -  - - - 100% 4 100% 11 100% 14 100% 13 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total Number 144 99 60 12 33 14 2 1 4 1 I 
' 226 124 167 113 19 14 38 I 49 \ 
- 
NOTE: A dash lndirstes that the percentage is less than one-half of 1 percent. 
I 
Source: Veroff, e t  a l .  (1981) 
the community, helping them to function at their highest potential. On the 
other hand, given the fact that many communities resist the establishment 
of half-way houses in their neighborhood, and given that state political 
economy has led to declining dollars for the mentally,ill, another group 
of citizens are subject to-the terror of our most vulnerable disorganized 
communities. - (See ~vir&n and Segal, 1973; Segal and Aviram, 1981; Scull 
1975; Lerman, 1982). 
A strange paradox has been created. The deinstitutionalization movement 
increases citizens' rights, decreases coercion, increases the provision of 
humane programs; but it is also possible that the state once more has ab- 
rogated its responsibilities to a dependent and poor population. 
IV: Legal Rights, Administrative Tasks and.Citizenship 
Between broad constitutional .provisions and legislative pronouncements 
about the rights of citizens and the duties of the State and the actual 
transaction of agencies with citizens lies a potentially vast chasm.   he 
extent to which the chasm is bridged in any specific policy area depends 
upon the interpretation of legislative enactments, adequate funding, adminis- 
trative competence, court interpretations, and citizenship empowerment. 
At least since T. H. Marshall, we have seen the extension of citizen- 
ship rights to the social welfare sector as part of the evolution of the .: 
modern state. But the extension and legalization of rights in America presents 
us with a crazy quilt. There are some dominant trends in the extension of 
rights, but they are uneven and there are times in which we seem not to be 
extending rights but to'be taking back rights. 
As commentators viewed the late 1960s, it became fashionable to discuss 
the "new property," government entitlements which gave people claims on 
government services (Reich). Under the current administration in Washington 
many of these entitlement programs have come under attack, and, if not 
eliminated, curtailed. However, we are not interested in discussing the 
actions of the current administration but trends and counter-trends which 
bear on bureaucratic client encounters. 
We offer these comments provisionally. First, in the institutional 
sector of the welfare state, the area consisting of mental hospitals, insti- 
tutions for the retarded, and even schools and prisons, the courts have 
intruded deeply into the day-to-day functioning of public facilities. 
Whether we are talking about - mental hospitals or public schools, 
for those institutions where clients are not of potential harm to society, 
the courts have moved to make more difficult the involuntary commitment and 
retention of clients. It is more difficult to deprive the non-criminal of 
their liberty now than it was twenty years ago. Secondly, the Federal Courts 
have mandated that citizens deprived of liberty or under the beneficient 
auspices of institutions, cannot abrogate civil liberties (rights of privacy, 
access to lawyers, rights of religion, the use only of reasonable restraints, 
etc.). Finally, and to a lesser extent, the courts have imposed a positive 
burden on public institutions; not only must they provide minimum standards 
of care, but their programs are expected to help clients achieve reasonable 
levels of social functioning. Mental hospitals are prohibited from overdosing 
clients, institutions for the mentally retarded are expected to teach the 
retarded skills which will allow them to function at higher levels. In some 
cases the courts have mandated specific plans for specific institutions. 
Although changes in the court-interpreted legal doctrines protecting 
the rights of institutionally dependent populations are clear, no one knows 
how much these changes in law have actually led to "real" changes in the 
behavior,of staff towards clients and in the outcomes for clients. While 
reports can be found on the impact of particular court decisions on the 
immediate case and parties involved, the impact of the cases as precedents 
in other jurisdictions and institutional settings unfolds over decades. 
It is probable that formal rights are protected more. But, since courts often 
do not control state and local budgetary allocations, and, in turn, since 
these governments have been faced with budgetary deficits, the overall result 
may actually be a wide-spread deterioration in levels of service. For instance, 
in one case we have followed in Michigan, the Department of Mental Health 
was under federal court mandate to raise the number of staff at an insti- 
tution for the adolescent retarded. It did so by transferring staff from 
other institutions that were not part of the original litigation, there- 
fore weakening the programs at other institutions. 
A second trend involves the development of mechanisms of appeal in cases 
where clients have property rights in government programs. At one time, 
government grants were treated in law as gratuities. Handler (1979) argues 
that the courts first treated government subsidies and licenses to business 
and professions as implied contracts. Thus businessmen and professionals 
had property rights, and therefore legal protection of due process as govern- 
ment agents administered these entitlements. In Goldberg vs. Kelly (1970) 
the Supreme Court extended these rights to social welfare programs. Goldberg 
and related cases have two implications for the administration of social 
'welfare programs. First, substantively, citizen rights are protected so that 
local policy and bureaucratic administration cannot abrogate entitlements 
on grounds irrelevent to the specific legislative intent. For instance, 
citizens entitled to AFDC or food stamps cannot be cut off.;'during the har- 
. vesting season because the local community wants to force workers into the 
fields. (State can set upworkfareprograms, if they so desire.) Similarly, 
agencies cannot abrogate other civil liberties such as ,rights to privacy without 
_ following the normal due process procedures governing illegal searches 
and seizures. (As used to be done by midnight raids, looking for a man 
in the house on AFDC). 
Not only are agencies enjoined to protect the civil rights and civil 
liberties of citizens. They also must provide for an appeals procedure against 
their decisions. Clients must have redress if they believe they are wrong- 
fully being denied entitlements. The form and strength of those appeals 
vary enormously. They include oral complaints reviewed by supervisors, legal- 
adversarial hearings in which witnesses may be called, the appointment of 
ombudsmen, the establishment of legal clinics to represent classes of clients, 
and others. Moreover, as Handler notes, the development of managerial controls 
and auditing devices may be required and encouraged to strengthen the hand 
of central officials in the enforcement of rules and limiting the discretion 
and variance of.line bureaucrats. These systems of appeal and enforcement 
vary in how proactive clients must be in order to protect their claims. 
Handler (pp. 44-a5) argues that the protection of rights entitlements 
is easiest where eligibility is clear-cut (e.g., age for Social Security 
eligibility) as opposed to less clear-cut (e-g., disability payments where 
diagnosis is difficult), and where the good or service is easily divisible 
(e.g., Social Security) as opposed to difficult to divide (e.g., housing). 
In the latter case, citizens have rights to be placed upon waiting lists and 
to have the list properly maintained, but not to the actual benefit of housing. 
(Let us note, that housing is theoretically as divisible as Social Security. 
The real issue is not divisibility in this case, but how much of the good or 
service the state allocates, and does it require certain minimum amounts; 
For example, if one switched from providing housing to providing a housing 
subsidy one would switch from a slightly non-divisible program to a fully 
divisible program. The state would still have to .face the question of how much 
housing subsidy to provide and at what cut-off point to allocate it). 
Handler also argues that rights are more easily enforced where clients have 
more resources and are less dependent on officials; they are then more likely 
to use appeals procedures. 
A final issue in understanding the interpenetration of citizenship rights 
and the welfare state in the American context surfaces when we consider the 
interplay of racial and ethnic status as they affect the allocation of goods 
and services in universal and selective programs. Ethnic and racial statuses 
serve as both de -- jure and de facto citizenship markers. On the one hand, -- ', 
residents who have different de -- jure citizenship status because of legal or 
illegal entry, may have different claims upon welfare entitlement, whether or 
not they have paid taxes. And at earlier times, local jurisdictions have used 
race and class as & facto criteria for including or not including groups 
on the welfare rolls. On the other hand, programs have been defined on a 
dimension of inclusiveness, roughly from universalistic entitlements to 
group-need definition of entitlements, to individual means tests. Since many 
programs continue to have wide variance in local and state administration 
(e.g., some states do not have Medicaid programs, AFDC programs vary signi- 
ficantly in payment levels between states), and since states vary in their 
ethnic-racial composition, wide variation in the experience of bureaucratic 
encounters are possible. In one state a significant group of residents, 
Hispanics, for instance, may avoid the state apparatus for fear of being de- 
ported; in others, their children may have access to public schools, and still 
in others, the political climate may lead officials to dramatically attempt 
to ease the sense of weakness and vulnerability in their administration of 
entitlements. 
It is clear that the leading growth areas of the welfare state in a 
monetary sense have been programs for the aged, and these programs had been 
universalistically administered and treated as a full property right. On 
the other hand, as the welfare state expanded in the 1960s to include a wide 
set of means tested goods and services,issues of citizenship and property 
rights combined with problems of distribution because of limited funding, have 
lead . to a new set of conflicts over the nature of entitlements in the 
welfare state. 
Conclusion 
Bureaucratic encounters in America and elsewhere must be seen in the 
context of power dependence relations. These relations are shaped by the 
structure of the law, the alternatives available to clients, the decentralized 
and centralization of bureaucratic functioning, the discretion or discretion 
inherent in the delivery of the product and factors affecting citizenship 
rights. 
The "quality" of the bureaucratic encounter is a function of the ability 
of the welfare state to allocate goods and services (the social surplus 
generated through the political process) and the inclusiveness of citizenship 
claims. By inclusiveness we mean the range of functional responsibilities 
which the state assumes and the universalism of its coverage of these functions. 
The mixed system of the United States almost always presents a large 
portion of its citizens with alternatives--the state is rarely the monopoly 
provider. For example, public housing is a small fraction of the housing 
market, public support for mental health and illness is growing, but is a 
small portion of the total, even Social Security provides a declining percent 
of the income of the population over 65 as private pensions grow. 
We suspect that for all American's complaints about bureaucracy, the 
welfare state bureaucracy just does not loom very large in the average American's 
life. Having said that, it is clear that different parts of the welfare 
state vary widely in their acceptance and their takeup. Consider Social 
Security and Public Assistance. The latter is stigmatized--the society is 
ungenerous, the beneficiaries are the undeserving poor. The former is all 
of us! The quality of bureaucratic encounters is then a behavioral-policy 
manifestation of citizenship rights. When the polity is loathe to grant those 
rights we can see the political manifestation of conflicts of class, race, 
and ideology. 
A central point of our argument has been that in none of the three areas 
we have examined can a static encounter be seen. Shaped by demographic trends, 
by transformations of technology, by changing social policy, the bureaucratic 
encounter is the micro manifestation of large social processes. They must be 
linked to the political economy of specific policy arenas and to larger 
trends in citizenship and the state. 
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